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BODIES, TEXTS, AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: A REPLY TO BIELEFELDT 
Carolyn Marvin 
 
I’m not sure why Klaus Bielefeldt thinks I trivialize horrible crimes, either those of Nazis or Charles 
Manson. My characterization of the Manson family murders as a literacy crime may be ironic in tone, 
but not in logic. American culture constantly circulates messages about the association between 
illiteracy and violent crime. One of the implicit tasks of popular press descriptions of violent criminals is, 
in fact, to suggest why such persons commit such awful disruptions of the social order.  
 If he were to assemble exemplary stories of this kind, I think Klaus Bielefeldt would find that of 
the many possibly relevant facts about persons accused of particularly violent acts, failures of literacy by 
community standards—failure to complete schooling at an acceptable level, for example—are among 
those most likely to be mentioned in order to telegraph the ways in which killers are presumed to differ 
from the rest of us. Charles Manson fits the pattern. David Koresh is a recent example. Accounts of 
Koresh constantly noted that he was a high-school dropout. That illiteracy leads to violence is a story 
told over and over to keep life ordered and in place. Generally speaking, this order assigns texts to high 
places and bodies to low ones. I assume Klaus Bielefeldt subscribes to it. His conclusion sounds an alarm 
about a world in which a system of literate control might be replaced by a system of illiterate, or bodily, 
control. The fact is there is only a system of bodily control, but we go to extraordinary lengths to conceal 
it behind the literate one.  
 Like Klaus Bielefeldt, I have little patience with vilifying people because they are male, female, 
black, white or any other set of attributes. This is not a piece about the evil nature of white male 
physicians descended from European stock, though some white male physicians of European stock play 
a role in it. It is a story about the logic of a social system in which those who are skilled at producing and 
using texts are also more entitled to preserve their bodies and shield them from physical effort and 
danger. The body, by contrast, is the emblem of those without textual credentials, whose bodies are 
available to be used up by society and whose powers of social participation derive from whatever value 
their bodies have for cultural muscle-work, the most dramatic expression of which is war.1 Among other 
things, the power of the textual class is the power to dispose of the bodies and lives of the non-textual 
class.  
 It is not a controversial fact that in the nineteenth century many of the persons best situated to 
acquire and exercise literate power in Europe and the United States were white and male. At the same 
time, most white males descended from European stock were subject to literate control rather than 
practitioners of it. And this is still true. In any case, to analyze the historical strategies physicians used to 
elevate their social status by defining themselves as textually credentialed in contrast to less respectable 
groups is no more remarkable than, say, tracing efforts by the academy them unsuited for literate work. 
This is not to say that literacy is an absolute signifier of cultural power. Many elements must be 
arranged to produce the complex social calculus of status. But in general, more textual credentials have 
greater privilege than fewer, literacy has privilege over non-literacy, and literacy exhibits deep hostility 
to the body within this framework.  
 Although the surgeon's piece of this story is relatively modern, the story of literate power is not 
a postmodern one at all. It goes back as far as the history of texts. At its core is the social fiction that 
writing is disembodied. Though writing can never get rid of the body, misrepresentation and denial 
enforce the socially constructed boundaries between them. This article examines a representative 
episode in this process: a moment in the history of medical professionalization when surgeons 
transformed themselves from artisans of embattled social respectability to textually credentialed 
professionals with far greater social authority and power than before. Surgeons did not cease to cut 
bodies or to be associated with the tabooed bodily activities of violence, blood, and death, but they 
added the power and prestige of a concealing textuality. They became, in short, physicians.  
 Surgeons are not the only group to make the social transition to literacy. Textualization is a 
feature of professionalization across occupations. But surgeons are an interesting group to examine 
because of the lengths to which they must go to textualize their connection to the body. How do you tell 
a nineteenth-century surgeon from a killer? Surgeons of that era invented strategies to do this, including 
literate procedures that identified them as members of a textual class entitled to deference, obedience, 
and even sacrifice of life on the part of those unable to defend themselves.  
 Part of the larger story is that those who are unable to conceal the connection between bodies 
and texts, or choose not to, become social monsters or wizards. They transgress a deeply felt divide, a 
magical border between purity and danger, to use Mary Douglas's categories. What is unnerving about 
Charles Manson's writing in blood and about books bound in skin—the victims are dead after all; what 
possible difference can it make what happens to their blood or their skins?—is that they place the 
indissoluble connection between the body and the text that society tries so hard to deny, squarely, if 
mostly symbolically, before us. It is we who make monsters or wizards of physicians who take the skins 
of dead people and use them to cover fine books, or of killers who refuse merely to draw blood, as 
regular killers do, but write with it as well.  
 I doubt if it is a new idea to Klaus Bielefeldt that physicians have enormous social authority over 
bodies. I hope it is not a new idea that the exercise of that control has not always been for the purest 
motives. If he imagines I excuse other textual groups, including university professors, from 
accountability for exercising textual power, he is mistaken. "Should I conclude that Carolyn Marvin is at 
least as literate and, by extension, as oppressive as I am?" he asks. He certainly should. Klaus Bielefeldt 
calls me to account in the system of literate control. I plead guilty. Some people use guns to maintain 
their power; others use machetes; many of us use texts. The most powerful texts are directly backed by 
physical violence. We are diverted, as we are meant to be, by stories of heroic exceptions—writing that 
exerts influence in spite of guns. But the goal of such writing, more often than not, is to get the guns to 
join it. 
 The textual classes are accustomed to deplore bodily force in order to take comfort in their own 
high-minded (ponder the opposite term) scruples. The rationalization that the textual classes inhabit a 
world of disembodied ideas in which they are able to refrain from taking part in collisions between 
bodies permits them not to notice that others do the dirty work of society on their behalf. I mean both 
work that soils the body and is classified as socially lowly for that reason, and the exercise of bodily force 
that keeps life safe for the textual classes, but which they often regard as morally dirty. Academicians 
are as prone as any members of the textual class to deceive themselves about what is required for them 
to maintain their textual position and influence. The business of elucidating the connections between 
literate practice and the control of bodies is the job of analysis.  
 If there is a hidden message here, it is not about physicians—I tried to be as clear as possible 
there—but about all who guard textual institutions, punishments, and rewards. Literacy has long been 
considered a great liberator, and it is. But like everything else that human beings create, it has other 
effects as well. Medicine is no different. We have recently learned of troubling practices since World 
War II by American scientists and physicians engaged in government studies of the effects variously of 
psychotropic drugs, radiation, and syphilis on the bodies of citizens unable or unasked to give 
meaningful consent. Physicians and scientists may do "studies" for the love of humankind, but the term 
refers to the process of producing and disseminating texts, especially journal articles and resumes that 
literally conceal the bodies that suffered to produce them. In my view, the suffering of the subjects in 
these studies (which I do not suggest Klaus Bielefeldt would defend for a minute) re-models that of 
indigent patients in nineteenth-century hospitals, and inmates subjected to experiments in 
concentration camps. I am sorry if Klaus Bielefeldt finds the latter comparison offensive, but I am not 
the only one making it. In records released by the Department of Energy, physicians involved in the 
radiation experiments of the 1950s made it themselves.  
 On the subject of Nazis, the fact is that it is hard to uncover reliable evidence that the Nazis 
bound books in human skin. There seems to be good evidence that they used human skin to make other 
sorts of artifacts, though I have not pursued most of this evidence to its limits. This does not mean the 
Nazis did not bind books in human skin. It simply means there is no convincing evidence available, as 
there is about gas chambers, forced labor camps, dare I mention medical experiments, and other forms 
of mistreatment. Such evidence may emerge from recently opened archives in eastern Europe. But this 
piece was not about the atrocities of the Nazis, whom I originally hoped, to leave out altogether. My 
subject was not them, but the exotic bookbinding practices of some nineteenth-century physicians. 
Audiences to whom I presented this research in progress, however, constantly provided associations 
with the Nazis. A large number of people claim to know that Nazis bound books in human skin. It is a 
compelling fact that tales of Nazi atrocities attach themselves so assiduously to stories about physicians 
binding books in human skin. In trying to understand it, I speculate that these may be disguised folk 
memories of a time when physicians had far more tenuous claims to respectability, were far less 
regulated (the textual classes are also disciplined) and far less textually credentialed.  
 Klaus Bielefeldt accuses me of believing in original sin. Again l plead guilty, since I have never 
found any human enterprise or theory that is immaculate in its conception, a peculiar nation about how 
the word became flesh in the absence of carnal knowledge, which is presumed to be contaminated. 
Perhaps fertile ideas are inevitably sinful ideas. I do not advocate illiteracy, naive or otherwise, but the 
belief that literacy is innocent is very naive. At best, literacy is a complex social process. It serves many 
purposes, including social control. Among students of literacy, this is not an unusual observation. What I 
added was not the notion that literacy is related to power, but that its power is constructed around the 
body, that this fact is constantly denied, and that both the fact and the denial play themselves out in 
complicated ways in the social order. Among them is that literacy is a system for allocating bodies, and 
for allocating resources to socially favored bodies. 
 The purpose of this article was not to defend literacy. Every member of the textual class knows 
this defense by heart. Nor, as an original sinner, do I advocate dismantling the edifices of literacy, 
though I hardly think they are above reform. I believe it is important to examine the workings of a social 
system that makes adversaries of bodies and texts, so that those of us who exercise privilege in it can 
answer in a more responsible fashion. But this is not a public policy piece, either. It is an effort to 
understand a fundamental and sturdy aspect of the social order, to explore how things come to make 
sense in the way they do. 
 One final point. Klaus Bielefeldt claims my conclusion that some nineteenth century physicians 
viewed their indigent patients with contempt is based on questionable assertions about the nature of 
materials used in bookbinding. He asserts a connection I did not make. I was quite clear about particular 
cases where claims about the composition of bindings are in doubt. The pattern of physician ownership 
of books bound in human skin emerged from the most probable cases, not the least probable. From 
these most probable cases, I selected the cases of Leidy and Stockton-Hough, about which I am 
especially confident, to examine further. These particular bindings have not been subjected to chemical 
analysis, the only sure test of their composition. But the convergence of several kinds of evidence, 
including testimony by the principals or their families, accounts by contemporaries, and the existence of 
other artifacts or documents offering independent confirmation, establishes a convincing case that in 
these instances we are dealing with books bound in human skin. Besides, to doubt it would be to call 
respectable physicians liars, and Klaus Bielefeldt thinks I have been mean enough to them already.  
 My characterization of some physicians' attitudes toward the patients who served them as 
anatomical subjects does not derive from the fact that they bound books in the skins of their patients. 
As far as I can tell, few did. It derives from testimony during legislative debates about the acquisition of 
cadavers for medical study and teaching. In this testimony some of the most prominent physicians of 
the period display a cavalier and arrogant attitude about those on whom they exercised their craft 
without controls or accountability. I invite Klaus Bielefeldt to read it. There is also much evidence that 
physicians in pursuit of cadavers regularly deceived families and patients to acquire· them. These 
indignities, real and perceived, produced popular riots and eventually, regulation, since public opinion 
came to see as intolerable the unregulated use of poor people as anatomical subjects for dissection in 
teaching hospitals. I did not base my conclusions about physician attitudes on anthropodermic 
bookbinding, as Klaus Bielefeldt suggests. I located anthropodermic bookbinding with reference to this 
constellation of attitudes, which provided the atmosphere in which some physicians found it reasonable 
to use human flesh to bind books. I also suggest that binding the skin of patients was probably a tribute 
to them by some of the physicians who did it, whatever Klaus Bielefeldt's view or mine may be. In the 
end, of course, this is an interpretive exercise arranging pieces of historical evidence much as a physician 
makes a clinical diagnosis, a point Klaus Bielefeldt recognizes. Each reader will have to judge how 
satisfactory it is.  
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